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The Aborted Italian Insurrection ofJuly 1948
Tom Behan
The attempted murder ofthe Italian Communist Party (PCI) leader
Palmiro Togliatti - the attentato a Togliatti in Italian - occurred
in July 1948, three years after the fall offascism and the end ofthe
Resistance movement. A spontaneous general strike immediately
erupted as soon as the news was heard, and in some northern cities
the strike took on insurrectionary proportions.
Given the scale ofevents it is significant to note that it is an issue
which is normally either fleetingly mentioned or completely ig-
nored in most ofthe standard historiographical works on the period.
One of the best books on Italian postwar political history, Paul
Ginsborg's A History of Contemporary Italy, an author whose
political views are sympathetic to Italian communism, devotes just
1.5 pages out of 350 to it. And despite stating that protesters "in
some central and northern provinces actually seized control oflocal
government and key communication points," in his A Political
History ofItaly Norman Kogan devotes just half a page to these
events. Yet another standard English textbook, Martin Clark's
Modern Italy, avoids the issue entirely, as does Donald Sassoon, a
long-time supporter of the PCI, in his Contemporary Italy. This is
to be put aside Daniel Horowitz's The Italian Labor Movement,
which devotes just one page out of341, again describing the action
thus: "a general strike with insurrectional overtones ... the govern-
ment was uncertain whether it was faced with a full-scale insurrec-
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tion. " The incongruity of this is that Sassoon has long identified
with Italian communism, whereas Horowitz was a US diplomat.1
Italian historiography has gone down the same path of fleeting
acknowledgment or total silence. For example a recent "Critical
History of the Republic" covering the period 1945-1994 and
written by somebody who defines himselfon the cover as being "a
militant ofthe Left ofCommunist opinions" devotes just one page
out of 340 to the attentato a Togliatti.2 Local studies often fare no
better: a major book on Milan, which deals with the 1939-51
period, written from a pro-PCI position, devotes just one line out of
300 pages to the event!3 The importance of writers' Communist
sympathies is particularly relevant here, because it was PCI mem-
bers and local branches that made up the backbone of the move-
ment.
Whilst these omissions should not perhaps be considered sur-
prising as regards conservative or social democrat historians, one
might expect that historical works composed under the influence of
the PCI would cover this event to a greater extent. The reason for
their reluctance is that the working class' behaviour does not
correspond to the PCI's strategy at the time; in other words, the
atlenlalo a Togliatti reveals the existence of a massive latent gulf
between the PCI leadership and the party rank and file.
See N. Kogan, A Political History ofItaly: The Postwar Years (New York
1983), 37; and D. L. Horowitz, The Italian Labor Movement (Cambridge
1963), 215. See also M. Clark, History ofModern Italy, 1870-1983 (London
1986); P. Ginsborg, A History ofContemporary Italy: Society and Politics,
1943-1988 (Hannondsworth 1990); D. Sassoon, Contemporary Italy
(London 1986).
2 E. Santarelli, Storia Critica della Repubblica: L'Italia dal 1945 al 1994
(Milan 1996). The two main specialised texts are that ofTogliatti's personal
secretary of the time, M. Caprara, L 'attentato a TogliaUi. 1114 Luglio 1948:
il PCI tra Insurrezione e Programma Democratico (Venice 1978); and W.
Tobagi, La Rivoluzione Impossibile. L 'at/entato a Togliatti: Violenza
Politica e Reazione Popolare (Milan 1978). Tobagi, a journalist, was later
murdered by the Red Brigades.
3 L. Ganapini, Una Cit/a, la Guerra: Lotte di Classe, Ide%gie e Forze
Politiche a Milano 1939-1951 (Milan 1988).
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Some statistics regarding arms seizures might convey the scale
of events with some immediacy. The official government figures
for weapons seized during 1948, particularly following the July
events, is far higher than for both 1946 and 1947 - and for some
categories even higher than 1945 - the year of official partisan
demobilisation. Police statistics detail the seizure of: 28 cannons;
202 mortars and grenade launchers; 995 machine guns; 6 200
automatic rifles; 27 123 rifles and muskets; 9 445 pistols and
revolvers; 49 640 grenades; 564 tons ofexplosives; 81 radio trans-
mitters; and 5.5 million rounds ofammunition.4
The existence of such massive amounts of weaponry held ille-
gally is ample proof of the feeling amongst the working class that
the end ofthe Resistance in 1945 was only the end ofthe "first half'
of armed struggle against the ruling class and that weapons had to
be kept in readiness for a decisive "second half' some time in the
future. This view was diametrically opposed to that of the PCI,
which insisted upon full military demobilisation in 1945 and that a
political strategy of"progressive democracy" be followed through
parliamentary channels.
The amount of weaponry recovered only tells part of the story
however. The fact that for three days in July 1948 millions of
workers spontaneously launched a disciplined movement that
threatened state power is evidence ofhow strongly the desire for an
insurrectionary seizure of power was felt amongst the working
class. Yet according to PCI historiography, by 1948 workers were
already fully wedded to the idea of' 'progressive democracy."
One ofthe reasons used to justify this argument is the definitive
electoral defeat for the left, which occurred three months earlier
during Italy's first postwar election. But the altenlalo a Togliatti is
an interesting political phenomenon in itself because it sheds a
different light on what conclusions to draw from the left's electoral
defeat in April.
4 Cited in P. Di Loreto, Togliatti e la "doppiezza. " 11 PCI tra Denlocrazia e
Insurrezione, 1944-49 (Bologna 1991),320.
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In many ways the attentato a Togliatti is a good illustration that
the political mood of large masses can not be gauged by electoral
trends alone. In more general terms it is an excellent illustration of
working-class creativity and resourcefulness. However, it is also a
sobering example of the need to identify empty radical rhetoric
before key moments of struggle, so that a protest movement does
not suddenly find itselfadrift without any organisational structure,
and tactically disarmed due to the impossibility of creating an
alternative organisation overnight.
This article is divided into two parts: in the first part there is a
broad outline ofthe major events that occurred between 14-16 July
1948; the second part discusses the underlying causes that contrib-
uted to such a mass explosion.
What Happened
On 14 July 1948 Palmiro Togliatti was shot three times as he was
leaving Parliament after a rather unimportant debate. His would-be
assassin was a twenty-five year old Sicilian student, Antonio
Pallante. Although he appeared to have acted alone, Pallante was
closely linked to right-wing circles. He was found to have a Liberal
Party card in his pocket, as well as an entry pass to Parliament given
out by a Christian Democrat MP from his home town of Catania.
A copy ofMein Kampfwas found in his hotel room, together with
"a diary full of notes on nationalism"; furthermore the hotel was
regularly used by known neo-fascists. At the moment of his arrest
he stated that he wanted to eliminate "the most dangerous element
in Italian political life, who through his activity as an agent of a
foreign power, is impeding the rebirth of the Fatherland."s
5 A. Grillo, Livorno: Una Rivolta tra Milo e Memoria: 14 Luglio 1948 - Lo
Sciopero Generale per L 'attentato a Togliatti (Pisa 1994),31. The use ofthe
word "Fatherland" (Patria) was common to all political parties and was not
particularly associated with Nazism.
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The news was broadcast over the radio at 1 PM and in most
factories workers downed tools and spontaneously went on strike.
No time limit was given to the strike and decisions varied as to
whether to remain inside the factory or to send delegations outside.
In either case, if weapons were hidden within a factory they were
often brought out and prepared for use.
Apart from factories, Giorgio Galli has described some of the
most common and visible reactions: "trains came to a halt in
stations as soon as railway workers heard what had happened,
urban transport was paralysed from early in the aftemoon.,,6 Such
a strong and immediate reaction is clear proofofboth the esteem in
that Palmiro Togliatti was held by the working class as well as the
political tension that was latent in society at that time.
What is particularly important to understand when analysing
developments over the next three days is the nature of the move-
ment's leadership, described again by Galli: "With the disappear-
ance of Socialist leaders and the indecision ofCommunist leaders,
the movement, which had arisen spontaneously, ended up being
characterised by the most determined and radical elements of the
PCI, Le. those who had joined the party because they believed in
something which to Togliatti seemed very odd.,,7 In other words,
the established national leaderships did not direct the popular
response, particularly during the first day.
Genoa: The Eye of the Storm
Genoa, the maritime city of Italy's industrial triangle, saw the
strongest response to Togliatti's shooting. Here is a contemporary
account of industrial workers' initial spontaneous response:
50 000 workers, who had mainly come from Sestri, had occupied
the city centre by early afternoon. Police headquarters ordered a
6 G. Galli, La Sinistra Italiana nel Dopoguerra (Milan 1978), 255.
7 Ibid., 240.
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patrol of five armoured cars to go out, which the crowd rapidly
took possession of; by late afternoon the city - as was the case in
most ofLiguria - was practically under the control ofthe masses,
led by Communists.s
The Prefect of the city - instinctively hostile to the protesters'
behaviour - described events rather differently:
numerous ex-partisans and large groups ofarmed hooligans were
busy with acts of violence in various points of the city; immobi-
lising trams and other vehicles, imposing the closure of shops,
setting up road blocks, and attacking and disarming all isolated
soldiers and policemen. A Lieutenant has been wounded, and 10
Carabinieri were captured, disarmed, mistreated, and taken to the
headquarters ofthe PCI and the ex-partisans' association.9
Such a rapid and mass unitary response clearly had to have a
clear point ofreference, and that was the Resistance struggle, both
in terms of its military actions and its political motivation ofdirect
democracy exercised by rank and file workers. Yet although the
Resistance model was reproduced on a military level in Genoa, the
movement did not last long enough to create any lasting political
effect. This is how a Communist trade union leader described the
military connection with the Resistance:
everything was stopped, the entire city had been divided into
sections and was in our hands even more so than in the period of
the partisan war. There was only one public authority in Genoa; it
was a huge emotional factor which had unleashed the most
revolutionary elements which were saying: the time has come to
settle accounts. Sectarian comrades dominated over the others.
There was the training of the partisan war, there were all those
young people who had fought in the mountains in a complete
military environment, they were an army excellently prepared for
this kind of war. They passed the word amongst each other -
"let's get the armoured cars" and it took them a second because
8 Ibid., 256.
9 W. Tobagi, 22.
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they were used to it. They had taken armoured cars and tanks off
the Germans for so many years in the same way. ID
The question then needs to be asked, who was leading these people?
More than anything else it would appear to be rank and file workers,
although local Communist leaders were also outraged by the attack
on Togliatti and enthused by the strength shown by such a impres-
sive wave of anger. This is how the Secretary of the PCI' s Genoa
Federation recalls events:
I went into the Federation, where there was a lot of confusion ...
Nobody knew what was happening; we were unable to contact the
leadership as the phones weren't working; ... At a branch level
everyone had got carried away, even the leading members, until
we arrived with our instructions. These were people who had gone
through the struggle for Liberation, there were some excellent
comrades who had dived into it all, but nobody from the Federal
Committee had done that ... as I was Regional Secretary I received
an invitation to take part in a meeting to be held outside Genoa on
that very day to discuss with other leaders, even though the
[national] leadership did not agree, how to coordinate action in the
North. I didn't go because I didn't believe a revolution was
possible. II
Not only does this quote illustrate the extent of support for an
insurrection, it also shows that even important local leaders, as was
the case in Milan as we shall see below, were also tempted to
support the movement and see where it led.
The Communist trade union leader again takes up the story:
the crowd had taken over from the police and had captured the
armoured cars, we were practically in a state of civil war. That
evening Genoa was already in the hands ofthe people, so much so
that at eight 0'clock, if I remember right, the Chief of Police
10 Cited in M. & P. Pallante, eds., Dalla ricostruzione alia Crisi del Centrismo
(Bologna 1975), 86. The original version can be found in P. Rugafiori,
"Genova," in F. Levi, P. Rugafiori and S. Vento, 11 Triangololndustriale tra
Ricostruzione e Lotta di Classe, 1945-48 (Milan 1974).
11 Cited in ibid., 86-7.
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phoned the ex-partisans' association and said: "Send me a group
of partisans to defend the police headquarters, because I'm com-
pletely isolated here." All the police had fled, the whole lot, it was
a terrifying situation.12
Public order was now in the hands of members of the Communist
Party, and the Prefect made an interesting political comment on the
leadership of the movement in the city:
In the meantime the situation was deteriorating, so it was thought
opportune for the Questore to make strong warnings to Socialist
and Communist party leaders, making them aware of their grave
responsibilities. Promises were made but one had, and continues
to have, the clear sensation that the leaders of these parties are no
longer in control ofthe situation. 13
The reality of the situation soon became clear to PCI leaders in
the major cities: they either had to launch an insurrection or stop
one. And apart from a few isolated cases in small towns, they
decided to stop moves towards insurrection. In the case ofGenoa,
the Federation Secretary makes it clear that even by early afternoon
they had arrived at the following decisions: "to get rid of the road
blocks, eliminate them, or if that wasn't possible disactivate them,
and not enter into conflict with the police; go back home in groups
to the party branches and calmly wait." Given the strength of
feeling which clearly existed, it is not surprising to learn of the
following response: "We all did what we could to make people go
away, I almost got attacked by demonstrators armed with sticks." 14
Any insurrectionary movement reaches a crucial moment at
which it must either take a risk and try to seize power, or otherwise
retreat to avoid senseless bloodshed. But given the political differ-
ences within the working class, and the sheer speed and spontaneity
12 Ibid.,85.
13 Cited in Tobagi, 23. The Questore is the local police chief, or the direct local
representative of the Ministry of the Interior. The Prefect is the direct
representative of central government, and therefore takes responsibility for
the Questore.
14 Cited in M. & P. Pallante, 86.
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of the movement, it was impossible for the PCI leaders who
consistently opposed an insurrection to get their positions accepted
quickly.
Nevertheless, one of the first key setbacks suffered by the
potential insurrectionary wave was the arrival and speech of the
PCI Mayor of Genoa, Adamoli, who made a speech where the
armoured cars had been captured, stressing the symbolic nature of
the action and the need to remain within the law. IS Yet it was fitting
that the major role appears to have been played by the Federation
Secretary, who after refusing to attend a meeting which would have
discussed the prospects for a revolution, went to see the city's
Prefect:
The Prefect wanted me to speak to the people from the balcony of
the Prefecture, something I refused to do. I had told the Prefect:
"you must withdraw the police because ifyou let them run around
there could be some clashes. We have given out instructions, and
we're continuing to give out instructions, we are keeping the
situation under control. You withdraw everything, and we'11 tell
people to go back to their party branches."
He had been in contact with Rome, where Scelba was in control;
it was hard for him, much harder than for us. It is not surprising that
he lost his authority, he had to accept; he saw that we had told
people to go away. There would have been hell to pay ifwe hadn't
made that decision, we did a really good job.16
What had happened in Genoa was that a mass movement had
spontaneously seized power in a major Italian city. Although this
movement had arisen spontaneously, in order to have taken power,
a high level ofpolitical agreement and cohesion amongst the large
numbers of people taking part must have existed. The demonstra-
tors clearly had a "common purpose" in a broad political sense. Yet
this cohesion was not brought about by Communist leaders, it was
15 Galli, 260.
16 Pallante, 87. Mario Scelba was the hard line Christian Democrat Minister of
the Interior.
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largely the work of the Communist rank and file and ex-partisans,
brought together not only by their sudden anger but also by the
model ofthe Resistance struggle and the successful insurrections of
April 1945.
But the situation in Genoa was far closer to insurrection than it
was in other northern towns and cities. We shall only look at one
other city of the industrial triangle, Milan, as space precludes the
possibility of presenting a detailed national panorama. Yet al-
though the movement was strongest in northern cities, according to
official figures between 14-16 July a total ofeighteen people were
killed and 204 wounded in clashes between police and demonstra-
tors, and the clashes ranged from Taranto in the deep South to Porto
Margherajust outside Venice.
The First Day in Milan
Although Milan may not have had such an immediately strong
insurrectionary upsurge as Genoa, particularly as a result of PCI
leaders' ambiguous behaviour, the protest movement here ended
on perhaps a higher or more militant note than in Genoa. Another
factor which helped to push events along was a kind ofunited front
between the PCI, the Socialist Party (PSI), and the CGIL, the main
trade union federation, dominated by Communists.
Furthermore, in Milan there was an even more recent military
precedent than the 1943-45 Resistance struggle, namely the occu-
pation of the Prefecture for two days in November 1947 in protest
of the sacking of the last Italian Prefect who had been an active
partisan fighter. 17
At Sesto San Giovanni, the area with the greatest concentration
of industrial workers, a mass meeting of 40 000 workers was held
in the early afternoon, and in accordance with initial instructions,
17 SeeT. Behan, The LongAwaitedMoment: The Working Class and the Italian
Communist Party in Milan, 1943-1948 (New York 1997), 205-10.
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workers returned and occupied their factories. Yet on a broader
level, the Milan edition of the PCI's daily newspaper l'Unita,
distributed that afternoon, struck a strident tone demanding:
"Down with this murderers' governmentl,,18
The situation began to significantly change in the course of a
mass rally held in the city's main square, Piazza del Duomo, during
the early evening. These mass rallies, compared to those which
occur today, were far more important due to the lack of television
and the perceived untrustworthiness of radio bulletins. They were
occasions when workers could glean the precise nature of an
organisation's suggestions and respond in a unified manner. Here
is an eyewitness account:
at 5 PM tens ofthousands ofworkers filled Piazza del Duomo, the
Social Democrat Mayor Greppi tried in vain to speak, whilst the
PSI Secretary ofthe Trades Council Mariani, and the PCI Federa-
tion Secretary Alberganti, invited the crowd to "occupy the
factories, fortresses of the working class"; Alberganti added:
"this is not a strike that will finish like others.,,19
Another account confirms this last phrase, and also adds a reference
made by Alberganti concerning the left's electoral defeat three
months earlier: "In Italy on 18 April we were all counted, today
we are being weighed. This strike will not finish either today or
tomorrow. ,,20 Such extreme language could only encourage radical
elements, and on Alberganti's part, his choice of words seemed to
suggest sympathy with the latent insurrectionary tendencies.
In individual factories the response was similar to that ofGenoa,
although the same kind of spontaneous move towards outright
insurrection was largely lacking. Here is an example from a light
engineering factory, in which a Communist worker outlines the
immediate response to the shooting and also admits to the existence
18 See G. Galli, Storia del PC] (Milan 1976), 319.
19 Galli, 1978,257.
20 G. Bocca, Palmiro Togliatti (Rome-Bari 1973), 513.
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oftwo tendencies within the party; those who wanted to wait for the
"line" and those who wanted "to go further":
straight away there was a ferment in the factory, everybody
stopped work. It was a kind of uprising; everyone downed tools,
an immediate strike and so on ... There was some resistance within
the party: there were those who wanted to go beyond a strike and
a demonstration, which they agreed with in any case, they wanted
to go further. 21
Another worker illustrates a quite well thought-out approach to
the question of insurrection. Whilst light weapons held within a
factory were probably sufficient for defensive purposes, a success-
ful insurrection would involve the seizure of important positions
within a major city, and so it was essential to at least possess heavy
weapons: "we wanted to go to the Carabinieri barracks in via
Lamarmora and get their armoured cars and tanks. But our leaders
were there, who advised us not to take that course of action ...
otherwise our intention was to get into the barracks, take their ar-
mouredvehicles, andthendrivethemaroundthecity. ' ,22
Once again, their intentions were clear, but it is interesting to
note that they did not carry their plans through because of the
intervention of local Communist cadres. Indeed to a significant
degree it would appear that local PCI cadres were far more moder-
ate in Milan than in Genoa, where many local cadres actively
supported the moves towards an insurrection. In Milan it appears
that the flames of radicalism were temporarily stoked by major
leaders. In any case, it is now time to look at the response of the
PCI's national leadership in Rome.
21 Interview with Gianni Ottolini conducted by the author, 1988. Ottolini was
born in 1926 and joined the PCI in 1944.
22 Interview with Luigi Moretti conducted by the author, 1988. A Socialist,
Moretti was born in 1923.
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Political crisis in Rome
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Throughout this first day ofthe crisis the initiative was clearly with
the demonstrators in the major cities and towns. The government's
only role was that of deciding what action the police and army
should take; whereas, the PCI leadership faced what was arguably
the greatest crisis in its history. With Togliatti hovering between
life and death, leadership passed to Pietro Secchia, and to a lesser
extent Luigi Longo. Secchia was the hard man of the Resistance,
and was universally recognised to be the PCI leader with the closest
relationship with the Kremlin. Yet with Togliatti incapacitated, and
an unexpected and unpredictable mass movement in progress,
leaders ofover twenty years' standing failed to provide leadership
in any real sense.
The first meeting of the leadership ended with the decision to
publish an appeal to all Italians, which was printed in the emer-
gency editions ofthe party's daily I ,Unita, part ofwhich read: "For
internal peace, for Republican legality, for the freedom ofcitizens:
for the resignation ofthis government ofhunger, division and civil
war!,,23
The leadership's first main response, therefore, was to call for
the government to resign. Yet at the same time as issuing a call to
action, they specified that any activity must stay within the law. The
demand for either the government's or the Minister ofthe Interior's
resignation was officially made by Gian Carlo Pajetta in Parliament
during a late afternoon sitting: "not only as Communist MPs, but
also as representatives ofmillions ofItalian workers, we say to you:
enough is enough - go away! Resign from government, you have
done too much damage. Do not murder the Fatherland. ,,24 In the
ensuing debate another PCI leader, Giorgio Amendola, compared
Togliatti's shooting to the murder of the Socialist MP Giacomo
23 Cited in Galli, 1978, 254.
24 Camera dei Deputati, Aft; Parlamentari Anno 1948, Discussioni, Vol. 1,
(Rome 1948), 1 244.
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Matteotti during the fascist period: "Murderers! Mussolini denied
everything as well.,,25 The response of the Christian Democrat
Prime Minister, Alcide De Gasperi, both in Parliament and in the
press, was to declare that the government would not resign. This
effectively put the ball back in the PCI's court.
At this point it would appear that the CGIL union federation
decided to place itself at the head of the movement by belatedly
calling a general strike in the late afternoon. Such a move was
important for the PCI, as it decreased its own responsibility for the
strike. But a crucial mistake was made in the sense that no other
demands were raised, so that the protest movement possessed no
secondary fall-back demands, such as calling for an end to the wave
of redundancies which were taking place at that time, or demands
to stop the rise in the cost ofliving, or further insistence on the legal
recognition of Management Councils - all issues which were
keenly felt by many workers.
The PCI leadership, meanwhile, was in permanent session
throughout the day. By early evening it must have known that the
country was paralysed, with cities cordoned off with road blocks,
factories under armed occupation, and widespread attempts to
occupy telephone exchanges, power and radio stations. Togliatti's
secretary, a witness to the leadership's meetings, has written that
both Secchia and Longo were explicitly rejecting an insurrection by
the late evening, although they had heard direct confirmation of its
support from Edoardo D'Onofrio, Secretary of the Rome Federa-
tion, who reported that many people in the capital were asking him
to "give the signal" to launch an insurrection.26
Late in the evening, Pietro Secchia sent his brother Matteo to the
Soviet Embassy, who soon returned with news that the Soviets
would not support any illegal action, i.e. an insurrection. Although
the leadership had said nothing publicly since early afternoon, they
had to make some decisions internally. Shortly before midnight it
25 Ibid., 1 248.
26 Caprara, 28.
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was decided to send the most experienced members to the major
trouble spots. Togliatti' s secretary recalls the following advice
which Longo gave Ilio Barontini, which characterised the leader-
ship's role throughout the crisis: "If the movement increases let it
grow, if it decreases suffocate it completely.,,27 Whilst the leader-
ship may have felt unable to disown the protest movement, they
were even less enthusiastic about encouraging it and giving it a
sense ofpurpose and direction.
However the PCI leadership also found itself dangerously ex-
posed in the sense that the government was aware of its desire to
bring the wave of protest to a close, but was also thankful that the
PCI had not developed any secondary demands. De Gasperi, in a
meeting held with the leader ofthe CGIL, Giuseppe Di Vittorio, on
the afternoon of the second day, had "received the impression
above all that the Communists want to bring the strike to an end, but
they are waiting for a pretext so as to not lose face. ,,28
At this point the government decided to apply more pressure on
the PCI, in the shape of a clear warning made by Mario Scelba,
Minister of the Interior, during a Parliamentary debate held in the
evening of the 15th: "we believe that it is the duty of the Govern-
ment to guarantee the safety of all citizens, with all the means and
powers at the disposal of a democratic regime, and through using
the laws and powers of the State, to re-establish order wherever it
has broken down. ,,29
The fact that PCI and CGIL leaders were unwilling to encourage
the protest movement meant that they were effectively paralysed. It
appears that no national directives were issued on the 15th, and
despite the three emergency editions rushed out the day before, it
also seems that /'Unita was not even published. Sometime during
the 15th the CGIL leadership decided to call the strike off, but
probably delayed the announcement due to the strength of feeling
amongst their members.
27 Ibid., 29.
28 Cabinet document, cited in Di Loreto, 309.
29 Camera dei Deputati, 1 282.
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The Second Day in Genoa and Milan
Very little of this was likely to filter through to people involved in
a semi-insurrection; most protesters probably did not pay a lot of
attention to parliamentary debates as they had far more pressing
questions to consider.
In most northern cities there was an uneasy stand-off between
demonstrators and government forces during the second day, with
neither side trying to gain supremacy. Although the protest move-
ment may have lacked leadership, the second day nevertheless gave
the protesters time to organise some kind of structure to their
activities, and to begin to feel the weight oftheir collective power.
In Genoa power had been cut overnight, and there were sporadic
attacks on police barracks and Christian Democrat party branches
in city suburbs, together with further disarming of policemen and
soldiers. A mobile police battalion was halted by barricades on the
city outskirts during the morning and the Prefect declared a state of
siege at 1 PM.3o Soon after this a joint meeting of Communist,
Socialist, Trades Council and Partisans Association leaders de-
cided to call on their members to abandon their road blocks. The
Mayor then went to visit the major barricades to invite people to go
home.
In this fashion the initiative which demonstrators had held the
day before was dissipated; the police and the armed forces began to
circulate again, but this was not because they had managed to
impose their will but because protesters had been persuaded to stop
their most militant activities and let them pass.
Furthermore, most workers understood that an insurrection
could only be successful on a national scale, and urgently awaited
information and instructions that were never to come. They began
to realise that the protest movement lacked both a national leader-
30 R. Del Carria, Proleta,.; Senza Rivoluzione, Vol. 4 (Rome 1975), 201.
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ship prepared to strengthen the wave of protest, and any precise
immediate objectives.
In Milan, the trajectory ofprotest was, ifanything, moving in the
opposite direction. The Prefect cabled Rome at 4.05 PM on the 15th
concerning the Motta factory, where occupying workers had been
evicted by police just ten days earlier: "About 9 AM several
thousand workers from nearby factories gathered outside the Motta
building, and after a bitter conflict with police forces who were
stationed inside the factory, penetrated the factory and set up
defensive measures."31 The Trades Council journal naturally de-
scribes the same event in a different manner:
workers, who know they are in the right, and who are getting tired
of allowing themselves to be beaten up, surround the armoured
cars not leaving a yard ofopen space. The police are immobilised:
no more violence, no more tear gas. Trades Council intervention
with the Prefect did the rest - the police withdraw and leave the
occupiers in peace.32
Another occupation, at the Bezzi factory at Lambrate, which had
recently been terminated by the police, was also resurrected after
a mass battle with the police.
A member of the VD/ante Rossa, or Red Flying Squad, recalled
his impressions ofthe second day in an interview conducted many
years later:
Driving around the city we checked on where police and army
vehicles were stationed. I remember that we had contacts with
army detachments who were ready to support us ifthe need arose
... Furthermore a meeting had been planned with the rank and file
of the police, and one presumed that not all of them would have
gone over to the other side ... Just imagine that even without
needing to fight the major public buildings had been occupied: the
31 Cited in Tobagi, 41.
32 R. Fenini, "Due giomi di epopea e la lotta non efinita" in the Milan Trades
Council \veekly, Bat/aglie del Lavoro, 20 July 1948.
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City Council, the Regional Council, the Prefecture, the radio
station.33
What is interesting to note at this point is that, according to the
Prefect at a series of workers' rallies held at 11 AM, "Speakers
stressed the theme of the Government's responsibility and the
necessity ofcontinuing the strike until its resignation. ,,34 Left-wing
leaders in Milan had perhaps not yet realised the difference between
calling for the government to resign, and insisting that the strike
continue until the government resigned. The message from the PCI
and the CGIL in Rome had consistently been the first of the two
formulations, whereas in Milan it had been slightly, but crucially,
altered into something different.
The Milan Trades Council met again in the afternoon, and
unanimously passed a motion which "unconditionally approves
the motion passed by the Trades Council Executive Committee on
the first day of the strike, and demands that a government of
national unity replaces the actual government. ,,35 Although such a
position was far from that of supporting an insurrection - indeed
it was basically a rehash ofthe Resistance alliance and the 1945-47
coalition governments which had involved the PCI - as regards
the movement in progress on the street it gave demonstrators a clear
demand to hold out for.
Yet as the hours passed this demand was seen to be less and less
likely to be achieved, and was to become quite a sterile slogan. And,
as was the case of the national demand being limited to just the
33 C. Bennani, "La Volante Rossa," Primo Maggio, 9/10 (inverno 1977/78),
100. There is no corroborating evidence to suggest that the Prefecture had
been occupied, although it is not surprising that somebody could not recall
with absolute accuracy a list ofpublic buildings occupied thirty years earlier.
The Vo/ante Rossa group, as the name implies, were an anned group of
several dozen men which existed on the margins of the PCI from 1945-49.
Some ofthem were party members, most were sympathisers, and their activity
was concentrated on militarily defending left-wing buildings or meetings,
and occasionally attacking fascist buildings or individuals.
34 Cited in Tobagi, 42.
35 Milan Trades Council archives, b. 60, f. 2; the minutes of the Consiglio
Genera/e delle Leghe.
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government's resignation, the Milan Trades Council had also failed
to seriously address any secondary or local demands.
Nevertheless, in the streets further confrontations seemed to be
looming. The Prefect reported that at 5 PM, "passenger transport
began with the use of fourteen vehicles set aside by the Civil
Transportation Inspectorate and escorted by policemen. But this
was terminated after a few hours due both to the lack ofpassengers
and the fact that following several incidents drivers did not want to
continue providing the service. ,,36
There were even more worrying signs for the Prefect by the
evening:
At 6 PM three under-age women were arrested in the vicinity of
the S. Ambrogio barracks whilst they were trying to give guards
type-written strips of paper which called on police not to fire on
workers. In the evening persons unknown positioned posters in
via Torino, which were immediately taken down, inviting police-
men to join with the workers.37
As was the case in Genoa, in Milan workers were still solidly in
control of many factories. Indeed, as is the case with the Vanzetti
factory, participation seems to have even increased by the second
night: "The number of comrades occupying the factory increased
significantly, and organisation is more disciplined.' ,38
The Final Day
In Genoa the end of the strike occurred with very few incidents.
Despite the fact that "when Spano came to Genoa on the third day
36 Cited in Tobagi, 43.
37 Ibid.
38 Archives of the Istituto Milanese per la Storia della Resistenza e del
Movimento Operaio, b. 56, f. 3. A factory report written by "E. M.,"
emphasis added.
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[Velio Spano was the PCI leader sent up from Rome] ... Everything
had stopped here; from Sarzana to Ventimiglia not even a bicycle
was moving.39 The reality of an insurrection, and the difficulties
involved, had been posed more starkly in Genoa than elsewhere,
and perhaps this was why, even on the second day, a sense of
disorientation had set in. Yet the number of factory occupations
and the fact that the city had, in effect, experienced an indefinite
general strike is clear evidence of workers' commitment to con-
tinue the struggle. But, they found themselves without any real
political leadership prepared to raise more specific demands or to
insist on the continuation of the movement.
In Milan, the Trades Council's intransigent stance of the 15th
was suddenly transformed into farce by the use of a ridiculous
justification to end the protest: "to get more precise information on
the situation, and to be able to judge things in greater detail. ,,40
Union leaders in Milan must have suddenly realised that they were
seriously out of step with other cities and hurriedly tried to fall in
line.
So it is not surprising, therefore, to learn that in Milan the
decision to end the strike encountered .widespread disbelief and
resistance. L 'Unita, whilst also calling on people to end their
protest, also acknowledged that: "throughout the morning the
combativity ofthe working class has grown, such that they arrived
at the time established for the end of the strike with the movement
even better organised than it had been on the first day. ,,41
Many workers believed that the call for a return to work was the
result of government disinformation; whilst others smelt a rat
within their own ranks. Thousands marched on the Trades Council
building to demand an explanation. Yet somehow the police had
got to the building before them, making workers very angry:
"You've called the police to protect yourselves against us" shouted
39 Pallante, 87. The two towns mentioned are at the two extremities of the
Ligurian coastline, and are about 150 miles apart.
40 Cited in Caprara, 68.
41 L'Unita, 16 July 1948, emphasis added.
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some Pirelli workers.42 Others shouted: "We've started and we
want to finish it. ,,43 The Trades Council denied they had called the
police; yet local PCI leaders refused to speak to the demonstrators,
as did Colombi, the PCI leader sent up from Rome. For several
hours the building was virtually under siege.
It was with a very heavy sense ofirony that the hardline Minister
ofthe Interior Mario Scelba could tell Cabinet on the morning ofthe
17th: "Last night in Milan the police 'protected' Alberganti.,,44
Giuseppe Alberganti was the Secretary ofthe PCI Federation, who
just two days earlier had thundered to tens ofthousands ofworkers
in Piazza del Duomo, "this is not a strike that will finish like
others," and indeed for him it ended with police protecting him
from angry workers who had taken him at his word.
This is also how the movement generally ended throughout the
country; with workers resentfully ceasing their occupations and
protests, and with the country taking two or three days to get back
to normal. The movement had not forced any concessions from the
government, and with the climate of Cold War now gaining pace,
over the coming years hundreds of participants would receive
prison sentences.
Having outlined the course of events over these three days, we
shall now move on to examine why the protest movement had been
so widespread and so radical.
Why it Happened
What needs to be explained is why hundreds ofthousands ofpeople
spontaneously downed tools, stopped their trams and trains, occu-
pied their factories, armed themselves and built barricades and so
on - all without having read any newspaper or leaflet or listened
42 Caprara, 69.
43 Battaglie del Lavoro, 20 July 1948.
44 Cabinet minutes, cited in Di Loreto, 316.
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to any of their leaders. Why had insurrection been such a wide-
spread unitary focus for so many people?
There are three main reasons for such an angry and widespread
response, in ascending order of importance.
The AprilElection Defeat
Communist and Socialist leaders certainly expected to get a high
vote in Italy's first postwar election, whereas in public they trium-
phalistically told their supporters they definitely expected to win a
majority and therefore form a government - and even printed
victory posters shortly before polling day. In these circumstances,
the defeat was a bitter pill for left-wing activists to swallow.
The campaign itselfhad been unprecedented in its anti-Commu-
nist hysteria, with its religiously-inspired attacks against Commu-
nist atheism. To win the elections the Christian Democrats had
resorted to mass psychological terrorism, conjuring up images of
Cossack hordes watering their horses in the fountains ofSt Peter's
Square in Rome - which was only one ofa whole range of images
invented to create fear and uncertainty. In his 1947 Christmas
message Pope Pius XII had warned that "Anyone who would want
to engage in practical activity, or provide their services, their
abilities, their help or vote to parties and powers which deny God,
is a deserter and traitor. ,,45 Furthermore, local Church organisa-
tions explicitly called for a Christian Democrat vote, and the
Italo-American community was mobilised to directly influence
relatives back in the homeland - just one tactic in a general
strategy of convincing Italians that the country could not really
survive without U.S. aid.46
45 Cited in E. Di Nolfo, Le Paure e le Speranze Degli Italiani (Milan 1986),
262.
46 The bibliography on the April 1948 elections is vast. Amongst others, see F.
Catalano, Una Difficile Democrazia: Italia, J943-48 (Messina-Florence
1980); R. Faenza & M. Fini, GIi AInericani in Italia (Milan 1976); S. Fedele,
Fronte Popo/are. La Sinistra e le Elezioni del J8 Aprile J948 (Milan 1978);
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Not surprisingly, therefore, the Christian Democrat vote in-
creased by 4.5 million compared to 1946, giving them 306 Depu-
ties, and an absolute majority in a Chamber of 574. But what was
more surprising for activists on the left was the fall in the Socialist
and Communist vote; the two parties ran separately in 1946 but as
a joint ticket in 1948, yet taken as a whole they lost nearly a million
votes compared to two years previously.
Much of this loss can be accounted for by the formation of a
Social Democratic party during the intervening period, but in terms
of industrial areas there was an even more worrying trend:
the Democratic Popular Front's (Socialist-communist) major
losses occurred in the industrial areas of the north, where two
years earlier the total ofSocialist and Communist votes had nearly
always reached an absolute majority. Out of a sample of 141
working class areas in the north, the Front suffered a loss of14.9%
compared to a national average of8.8%.47
The reasons for this drop in support will be dealt with below, yet
the memory and bitterness of both the election campaign and the
left's electoral defeat was still very fresh in people's minds, given
that it had taken place just under three months earlier.
The extremely polarised nature ofthe campaign, and the start of
the Cold War, had created an atmosphere which many militants
likened to the beginning of a civil war. Rumours circulated about
the possible banning of the PCI, and following such a definitive
electoral defeat many activists started to think that there was no
future in a parliamentary strategy. As the author of a recent major
study ofthe PCI during this period has argued, the 18 April election
A. Gambino, Storia del Dopoguerra (Rome 1978); M. Isnenghi & S. Lanaro,
La Democrazia Cristiana dal Fascismo al 18 Aprile (Padua-Venice 1978);
R. Orfei,L 'Occupazionedel Potere: 1Democristiani, 1945-75 (Milan 1976);
P. Scoppola, La Proposta Politica di De Gasperi (Bologna 1977); S. Woolf,
ed., The Rebirth ofItaly (London 1972).
47 M. Legnani, L'1talia dal 1943 al 1948 (Turin 1973), 206.
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defeat had the effect of" often provoking the worsening ofpolitical
differences, and providing 'revolutionary' tendencies with argu-
ments which undoubtedly gained a hearing. ,,48
A week later a carabiniere, trying to enforce a police ban on
marches to commemorate Liberation day - 25 April - was shot
and killed by demonstrators in Milan. It seemed that "one part of
the party felt that the defeat was a kind ofproofofthe impossibility
of gaining power through legal channels, thereby drawing the
opposite conclusion of the need to 'take up the machine gun
again. ' ,,49 As one PCI worker in Milan has put it: "The idea that
there ought to have been a continuation of the armed struggle was
inside all of us ... It was a treasure we wanted to keep hold ofjust in
case."so
Differences of opinion also emerged during a leadership meet-
ing held eight days after the election, in which Velio Spano argued:
"the fact is that after 18 April provocative propaganda and individ-
ual persecution have become more threatening than before. My
view is that we have to respond to this with a similar level of
violence. ,,51 Despite the "extremist" formulation given here, it
should be remembered that no PCI leader ever argued consistently
that the party move onto a more militaristic or insurrectionary
footing - indeed as we have already seen Spano played a key role
in defusing the movement in Genoa. However the fact that a leader
of Spano's calibre - born in 1905, member of PCI youth wing
from 1923, imprisoned for five years under fascism, and a Spanish
civil war veteran - could engage in such rhetoric was nevertheless
a sign ofdeep disquiet.
48 R. Martinelli, Storia del Partito comunista ita/iano, vol. 6. Il "Partito
Nuovo" dalla Liberazione al 18 Aprile (Turin 1995), 364.
49 Ibid., 356.
50 Interview with Marcello Corinaldesi conducted by the author, 1988. Born in
1906, he joined the PCI in 1943.
51 Martinelli, 361.
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Workers had arguably played the major role in the Resistance
movement, which in itselfwas a key factor in the defeat offascism
and Nazism in Italy. Indeed it has been estimated that by April 1945
there was a partisan army of up to 300 000 people in Italy, which
forced the German and fascist forces to station fourteen oftheir 32
divisions behind their front line with the Allies.52
Furthermore, many large towns and cities had successfully
launched insurrections which forced the surrender of major Ger-
man and fascist formations, an event which generally occurred a
few days before the arrival ofAllied forces, leading to a situation in
which partisans briefly held direct power.
The sacrifices which had been made in this period, and the hopes
which had been raised, were soon to be cruelly dashed. The Allies
severely limited newspaper publication and mass rallies, and the
trials ofmajor fascists often ended with very light sentences being
handed down. Furthermore, the tens ofthousands ofknown fascists
who had intimidated people in localities and workplaces, together
with the fascist civil servants notorious for their corruption and
hostility towards the general public, were by and large given
amnesties. For example the release of the ex-prefect of Genoa,
Carlo Emanuele Basile, provoked a widespread sense ofoutrage in
August 1947. During the war he had apparently been responsible
for the deportation of6 000 workers to Germany and the execution
of 689 anti-fascists, and the sentence of twenty years' imprison-
ment was felt to be far too lenient when it was handed down in June
1945. But he was released after serving just over two years of his
sentence.
52 See R. Battaglia & G. Garritano, Breve storia della Resistenza italiana (Rome
1964); G. Bocca, Storia dell 'Italia Partigiana (Rome-Bari 1977); P. Secchia,
11 Pci e la guerra di liberazione. Ricordi, documenti inediti e testimonianze,
in Annali Feltrinelli, anno xiii (Milan 1973).
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The PCI took an active part in all these measures, as it was one
ofthe major parties in the government coalition of 1945-47. Indeed
Togliatti as Minister ofJustice signed the amnesty decree absolving
fascists of past crimes. Militants on the ground strongly disap-
proved ofthe peI's moderation. One manifestation ofthis dissent,
concerning fascists' evasion ofjustice, was the number ofpolitical
assassinations which took place in the postwar period. In recent
years there have been attempts to exaggerate and criminalise such
aspects, renaming the Emilia Romagna region as "the triangle of
death. ' ,53 Yet these acts ofviolence - together with the brief and
peaceful protest actions of partisans returning to the hills - were
clear evidence that the rank and file believed that they had to launch
actions regardless ofthe views oftheir party leaderships.
Whilst the political system moved towards a standard bourgeois
democracy, economically the country began to develop into a
conventional free market system, strongly dependant on the United
States.
The high hopes that had existed in 1945 began to be transformed
into passivity and cynicism by 1947, hence the left's bad perform-
ance in 1948. Furthermore, the peI's response to the ejection ofthe
Communist and Socialist parties from government in May 1947
was extremely muted. The following statement, made by Togliatti
at a Central Committee meeting on 3 July 1947, also illustrates, in
a rather incongruous fashion, the leadership's overriding concern
ofmaintaining an alliance with the middle classes:
I believe that ... the most favourable element for us has been the
fact that we left government without launching the slogan of an
insurrection, something which has led to a growth in our party's
prestige amongst specific social strata, and especially amongst the
middle classes, which would not have occurred ifwe had declared
a general strike as soon as we left the government.54
53 See N.S. Gnofri, If Triangofo Rosso (1943-1947). La verita suI dopoguerra
in Emilia-Romagna attraverso i documenti d'archivio (Roma 1994).
54 Cited by A. Agosti, "11 partito comunista italiano e la svolta del 1947," Studi
Storici, 1 (1990), 59.
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The price that the PCI had to pay for reassuring the middle
classes was the demoralisation of the working class. The vast
majority of the hopes and expectations which had arisen after
twenty years of fascism had not been achieved. The Christian
Democrat Prime Minister De Gasperi had freed himselfof the PCI
and PSI without suffering any significant setbacks, and both his
party and big business now had far more room for manoeuvre in
enacting the economic and political measures they believed were
necessary.
The dissent which had been building within the party and
amongst its periphery suddenly found a focus in July 1948; but this
explosion was also the result of a more subtle and devious tactic
employed by the PCI leadership in the immediate postwar years,
that ofdoppiezza.
Doppiezza or Duplicity
The following comments are a good illustration of the nature of
doppiezza. After the events described above had ended, a PCI
worker commented in Genoa: "At that moment people believed
that the real party line ·was emerging, yet the central leadership of
the party immediately fought against this line, circumscribing the
protest. ,,55 And as a PCI trade union leader commented: "This was
the situation in Genoa; there was a double line. Not one instruction
was received ... There were two policies, also at a national level.
Comrades' analysis was this: we are one step away from taking power
- why don't we make the effort and take that step?,,56
The theory, which was never spelled out in public for obvious
reasons, and only mentioned briefly by PCI leaders to selected
audiences, was the following: parliamentary democracy was sim-
ply a Trojan Horse, which would be discarded when they gave the
signal to take up arms again and resume the second-halfofthe class
55 Pallante, 84.
56 Ibid., 86.
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struggle, which had come to a halt in April 1945. In this fashion the
peI's moderation became acceptable to its more radical member-
ship:
The party's caution over reforms and the line of national unity
were both viewed as tactics to not exacerbate a situation in which
the balance of forces should not be challenged. There was an
enthusiastically positive evaluation ofthis policy as it was seen to
be very clever, given that it confused class enemies who could then
be attacked by launching the revolution at the most opportune
moment. This is why there was a total lack ofopposition as regards
the general [party] line, whereas contrasts on aspects which were
considered to be secondary or merely temporary still existed. This
is also why positions which rejected the party's strategy, put
forward mainly by socialist but also some anarchist workers,
encountered such difficulties.57
In other words a deliberate ambiguity was tolerated within the
party as regards future intentions. Here is another useful description
by Giorgio Galli:
In the PCI it is perfectly acceptable to believe that Togliatti does
or doesn't follow Lenin; it is reasonable to think that he really
believes in what he says or that he thinks exactly the opposite, or
that Secchia agrees or disagrees with him, or that the party is or
isn't aiming at a revolution in Italy; those who believe these things,
however, must not express them publicly ... they can discuss these
opinions with the Branch Secretary or maybe with the City
Secretary or a member ofthe Central Committee, but they can not
raise this in debate or discussion.58
This enabled the leadership to attract and hold onto many of the
most radical elements of the working class within the party, and
these militants themselves were given some basis to hope that the
time would come when the leadership would order an insurrection.
57 R. Anfossi, La Resistenza Spezzata (Roma 1995), 137..8.
58 Galli, 1978, 132.
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In concrete terms, in July 1948 this meant that many people waited
for the PCI to give the order to rise up in revolution, but the PCI
leadership never had any intention of doing this.
In some ways it is surprising that there was such a widespread
and naive faith in doppiezza; but this can largely be explained by
considering the nature of party membership. During the twenty
years of fascist rule the working class had had no· opportunity for
real political debate, but they had also had no opportunity to notice
the evolution in the PCI's strategy. "Communism," as such, had
never been defined or debated in any great detail and for many
activists, given the twenty year lack of discussion which fascism
had created, the dominant conception ofcommunism was likely to
be that of1917 - that ofan armed working class seizing power and
creating a new form ofgovernment.
Yet the PCI leadership had abandoned this perspective in the late
1920s, when it had effectively become a mouthpiece for the Krem-
lin's foreign policy. The revolutionary internationalism of Lenin
had been transformed into Stalin's "Socialism in one country," and
in the postwar years many western Communist parties were to
slowly and tentatively embark on their own "national roads to
socialism." The nature of this evolution within the PCI during the
fascist period only affected the leadership based outside Italy, as the
party only had at most a few hundred isolated members operating
in Italy during the fascist period. For example only 28 delegates
came from Italy to the Fourth PCI congress held near Cologne in
April 1931. Pietro Secchia has estimated that there were only about
30 PCI members active in Italy at this time, and to avoid arrest they
operated according to strict conspiratorial rules.59
Antonio Roasio, another key PCI leader in this period, later
admitted that by the mid 1930s:
59 P. Secchia, L'azione svolta dal partite comunista in Italia durante il fascismo,
1926-32. Ricordi, documenti inediti e testimonianze, in Annali Feltrinelli,
anno xi (Milan 1969), 375.
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Throughout the country the party's organisations had fallen in on
themselves, the main activity was distributing our publications,
which often arrived late and carried arguments which didn't
correspond with reality ... there was an attempt to cover things up
by using extreme slogans, which had very little impact on the
members working in Italy, and to shift the blame for problems
through giving examples ofopportunism and the scarce assimila-
tion ofLeninism and Stalinism amongst our members.60
In other words, given the numbers involved the "Bolshevisation"
or more accurately "Stalinisation" ofthe PCI occurred without the
knowledge of the Italian working class.
Even during the Resistance movement, the PCI had either been
unable to tell many sympathisers, or even to fully convince them,
of their abandonment of working-class revolution in favour of the
parliamentary road to socialism, or "progressive democracy" as it
was called at the time. Nevertheless, the difference compared to the
1920s was now explicit, as deputy leader Luigi Longo argued at a
clandestine conference in November 1944:
we are fighting today not for the dictatorship ofthe proletariat but
for a progressive democracy, something which is distinct not so
much for its democratic content, but above all for its social
content. Progressive democracy doesn't radically damage the
principle of exploitative capitalist property relations as the dicta-
torship of the proletariat does. On the contrary, it preserves
individual peasants' private property and protects citizens' indi-
vidual ownership of the income of their own labour, their own
savings, and artefacts and assets of personal use, as well as the
right ofhereditary ownership ofsuch assets.
Today we are fighting for progressive democracy because we
believe that in the current political conditions in Italy, it offers the
only situation in which it is possible to create national unity
amongst all democratic and progressive forces, a unity indispen-
sable and necessary for a successful prosecution of the war of
liberation, as well as for reconstruction once liberation is
60 A. Roasio, "Note sulla teoria del partito dal '37 al '43," Critica Marxista,
2/3 (1972), 177-8.
'Going Further'
achieved. Today the struggle for progressive democracy is the
only national policy, because through the unity of the entire
population in a constructive and positive effort, it permits the
overcoming of the catastrophe into which fascism has thrust us,
and allows a united and consensual Italy to present itselfin the face
of all those who would intend to threaten freedom and inde-
pendence.61
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The nationalist tones and parliamentary strategy outlined in such
a speech were not only totally different to the Communist move-
ment ofthe early 1920s in an objective sense, they were also totally
new concepts for those workers who had recently decided to
become members or sympathisers of a Communist party. And the
pressing needs of the Resistance struggle meant that this anomaly
was never resolved within the party. Much ofthis disagreement and
confusion carried on into the early postwar years, as can be seen in
the widespread habit of holding onto arms after Liberation, in the
face of the PCI's call that all weapomy be handed in to the
authorities.
The rapid growth of the party also made it impossible for the
more experienced members to convince the rank and file. For
example, membership ofthe Milan Federation rose from 15 000 at
Liberation in April 1945, to 84 000 on 30 June and 110 000 in
October.62 In short, in 1948 most industrial workers closely associ-
ated the party with armed revolution, and many party members still
believed that the party would one day give the order to seize power.
In any case, the hopes which doppiezza raised amongst many PCI
members and supporters were revealed as a cynical deception in
July 1948, one of the many employed by Stalinist leaders around
the world for several decades.
61 Cited in Secchia, 1973, 673.
62 This is taken from a document entitled "Rapporto politico - organizzativo
25 Aprile - 30 giugno 1945," and held at the PCI's central archives, the
Istituto Gramsci, 089.409. See also Vento, in F. Levi, P Rugafiori and S.
Vento, 117.
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If such cruel deceptions were enacted, then the Stalinist nature
of the PCI needs to be stressed, and there was no greater embodi-
ment of Stalinism than the PCI's leader for nearly forty years,
Palmiro Togliatti. Since his death in 1964 the PCI has successfully
managed to create a myth about his supposed independence from
the Kremlin, yet a briefexamination ofhis activities reveals this to
be an excellent example ofa rewriting of history. During his long
stay in Moscow during the fascist period, Togliatti was the Secre-
tary ofthe Third International for nearly ten years, in a period which
included the Moscow show trials.
His activities in Spain during the civil war have never been fully
explained. In view ofwhat is now known ofStalinist repression of
anti-fascists, Togliatti's final dispatch from Spain in May 1939
makes for chilling reading: "Trotskyist agitation has recently
changed in content: it has abandoned its pseudo-revolutionary
demagogy and has been accusing the Communist party ofbeing the
only obstacle to the attaining ofpeace. At the same time arrests have
revealed the reinforcing of the links between illegal Trotskyite
organisations and the Falange.,,63
Given the heterogenous nature ofthe PCI during the 1940s, and
the easy availability of weaponry, it is not surprising to learn that
the dozens of murders of Trotskyite and Bordighist activists are
suspected to be the work of PCI members. The similarities with
Spain are almost too superfluous to mention. It was only after the
aborted insurrection of 1948 that the PCI leadership were able to
instil some degree of ideological uniformity within the party and
transform it into a fully Stalinist mass party - a reality which is
often overlooked by most observers, who somehow project back-
wards the break with the Kremlin, which only began very timidly
with the Russian invasion ofCzechoslovakia in 1968.
63 Cited in Anfossi, 117.
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So was a revolution possible in July 1948? We shall never know
the answer to this kind ofquestion. Any bid for power is a gamble
whose result cannot be known in advance. What one can say is that
the protest movement, which succeeded in paralysing the country,
showed tremendous power. One then needs to imagine how much
stronger such a movement would have been if it was coordinated
and directed at a national level, rather than just being a series of
spontaneous local explosions.
The notion that the PCI did not have the strength to launch an
insurrection is contradicted by the fact that weaker forces, princi-
pally the Bolsheviks in 1917, gained power from a smaller base of
support. Before the October revolution the Bolshevik party prob-
ably enjoyed about 25% support in electoral terms, whereas once it
had gained an absolute majority of votes in the Moscow and St
Petersburg Soviets decided to launch an insurrection.
In 1948 the PCI had over two million members, it also enjoyed
roughly two-thirds' support in elections ofa trade union movement
ofover six million members. The issue here is not so much whether
all these members or supporters were necessarily in favour of an
insurrection, but that the basis of support for insurrection clearly
existed within the Italian working class. It is pretty much a rule that
objective data concerning support for a revolution illustrate minor-
ity support before an insurrection, and that revolutions become
movements ofthe majority ofthe working class in the course ofthe
revolutionary movement itself. Apart from the Russian revolution,
one can consider other examples such as the revolt of workers in
Barcelona in 1936, the first protests in Budapest in 1956, the
uprising in Timisoara in Rumania in 1989, and so on.
The rebuttal of an insurrectionary hypotheses automatically
involves discussion of the likelihood of American intervention.
Although this would certainly have been a distinct possibility, if a
major country such as Italy had erupted in revolution then the
Americans would have found themselves severely stretched, what
with the civil war that was already raging in Greece, the Berlin
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airlift, the impending war between Israel and the Arab states, the
collapse ofChiang Kai-shek's army in China, and so on. A seizure
of power in Italy would have also galvanised radical elements in
other European countries which were experiencing severe social
tension, such as Belgium and France. Yet these tactical discussions
often miss the point, in the sense that the PCI had long rejected the
perspective ofa frontal assault on capitalism.
In many ways to define both the Resistance movement and the
July 1948 uprisings as "betrayed revolutions," as much ofthe New
Left did in the 1970s, is to miss the point, given that the PCI had
never promised to launch a revolution along the lines of1917. What
the successful insurrection of 1945 represents is a kind of "inter-
rupted revolution",64 which could only be successfully completed
if large masses of people were guided by a large and influential
revolutionary party.
In 1945 the PCI only wanted to destroy fascism and end German
occupation, and it launched an insurrection to achieve those aims
alone. In July 1948 those two objectives had already been achieved
and for the masses at the barricades the enemy was solely bourgeois
political democracy and a capitalist economy. The PCI leadership
fully accepted to work within this framework and consequently
disowned the challenge to state power; in effect the "betrayal" of
working-class revolution which occurred had taken place around
twenty years earlier, unknown to most ofthe protagonists. This was
Stalin's long-term transformation ofcommunism on a world-scale
from an internationalist revolutionary movement into a nationally-
based accommodation with capitalism.65
64 See for example the title of one of the chapters in R. Del Carria, Proletari
senza rivoluzione, "The war ofliberation against fascists and Gennans as an
example of an interrupted revolution."
65 See D. Hallas, The Comintern (London 1985) for an account of the Third
International, and 1. Molyneux, What is the Real Marxist Tradition? (London
1985) for an analysis of the various strands ofworld communism during the
twentieth century. See the relevant articles in International Socialism
(London) 52 (Autumn 1991) and 55 (Summer 1992) for a discussion of
Leninism and Stalinism.
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The most important thought the events ofJuly 1948 should leave
us with is the necessity to distinguish between different kinds of
communism, and the aim ofthis article has been to demonstrate the
existence of two different conceptions-of communism in Italy
during this period: the communism which believed in parliamen-
tary change and the communism which believed in revolutionary
change.
The dissolution of the PCI in 1991 has placed the definition of
communism under the microscope once again, with the creation of
an openly social democratic Democratic Party of the Left (PDS)
and the more traditional Communist Refoundation. And despite the
pronouncements over the last few years concerning "the end of
history" and the existence of a "new world order," the combined
vote ofthese two parties is still not much lower than that of the old
PCI. More important still, Communist activists were the backbone
of a strike movement which constituted the rock which holed and
sank Silvio Berlusconi's right-wing government in 1994.
For these activists the need for a "Refoundation" of commu-
nism has recently become quite stark. The election of a "left"
coalition government in April 1996, in which the PDS is the largest
party, and which is supported externally by Communist Refounda-
tion, obliges many Communists to urgently re-assess their ideas.
The reason for this is that the government is committed to public
sector cutbacks and privatisations - not for nothing did the Italian
stock exchange rise by 5% the morning after the left's victory. In
other words the debate over what communism is and what it isn't,
what has constituted communism and what hasn't, who has really
represented it and who hasn't, is far from over.
